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Abstract 
As other authors in this collection have stated, post-truth came into common parlance as 
commentators analysed and reflected on election campaigns and their results: the suggestion 
being that emotions and beliefs had become more powerful than reasoned, fact-based 
argumentation. Given that most campaigns present their own redacted perspective of reality 
into an environment containing multiple, contested alternative interpretations, the association 
between the most contested variant of a campaign, a political contest, and post truth is 
unsurprising. All campaigns contain elements of post-truth, appeals to emotions which build 
bridges between that which is sold and the identity of the consumer. Campaigns may 
encourage people to think but also to feel, and as such campaign strategies chime with 
understandings of human engagement and the levels of cognitive attention given, with many 
decisions being gut responses rather than being carefully considered. Our research focuses on 
two UK contests, the 2016 referendum on membership of the EU and subsequent 2017 snap 
general election. Interviews among older voters who voted to leave the EU and younger 
voters who supported Corbyn-led Labour give insights into how what might be seen as 
peripheral aspects influenced voting decisions. The data we suggest highlights challenges for 
democratic institutions, as populist voices present themselves as change agents to win support 
from voters dissatisfied with consensus politics. Mainstream politicians meanwhile are 
mistrusted while the arguments of outsiders who appear authentic are given credence. Such 
observations go to the heart of issues facing democracy and place debates surrounding post-
truth as core to those challenges. This article offers insights into how voter choices reveal 
cognitive processes that explain the link between campaign communication, belief formation 
and voter choice making all of which combine to threaten democracy.  
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Introduction 
“I feel you can’t really believe any politician. They say what they think you want to 
hear and hide the important stuff. [Interviewer: so do you just disengage from 
politics?] No I vote, I try and work out what sounds most likely or who is least likely 
to tell lies for bad reasons. We all hide stuff but for the right reasons, you wouldn’t 
tell someone they were ugly just to be truthful would you, so I try and work out for 
myself who and what to believe” (extract from an interview with a Politics student at 
Bournemouth University) 
 
It is unorthodox to begin an article with an extract from the data but the above extract from an 
interview captures one of the issues at the heart of discussions around post-truth. As a 
consequence of living in an age when marketing communication is not only pervasive in 
public life, but also widely discussed and critiqued, the average citizen is likely to view 
political communication from many sources with a degree of scepticism while also 
attempting to estimate how true a claim is or a political communicator might be. One might 
argue that every campaign, corporate or political, every advertisement, every piece of 
strategic communication, offers a redacted view of reality one that is produced to offer an 
audience the foundation for a set of attitudes that align with the strategic objectives of the 
producer. Whether the claim is that ‘Heineken refreshes the parts other beers cannot reach’ or 
that Theresa May offers the ‘strong and stable leadership’ Britain in 2017 required to deal 
with the challenges of Brexit, both are only believed if they are deemed to be believable. In 
other words neither can be proven prior to the point of purchase or election, so the citizen 
must calculate how true they believe each claim to be. Of course buying a pint of lager and 
finding it does not meet expectations is to most an insignificant commitment, electing a prime 
minister for five years has more long term implications. Yet as political and marketing 
communication become more closely intertwined, and all political performances become 
sales pitches rather than frank and open accounts of the processes of governance, the 
processes of disaggregating the reality from the claims made becomes increasingly 
complicated 
 
Believability, and the notion that some claims ring truer than others independent of the 
evidence presented is what is claimed to make the post-truth era distinct. The phrase entered 
common parlance in the context of electoral contests, specifically the UK’s 2016 referendum 
on EU membership, and the 2016 US presidential election, but arguably it can apply to 
ongoing public engagement with political communication. For politicians to offer redacted 
views of reality is nothing new. Plato railed against the use of eloquent but deceptive rhetoric 
by the Sophists in the 4th century BC, Machiavelli advocated the use of spin in pre-
renaissance Italian states, and as Garland (this volume) notes, the processes behind post-truth 
are embedded within the art of politics. What has perhaps changed is the pervasive way in 
which persuasive communication, from multiple sources, some whose motives and identity 
are obscured, is disseminated across the hypermedia environment. As citizens intersperse 
television watching with monitoring of social media, viewing videos on YouTube or Vimeo, 
browsing websites, listening to digital radio and navigating the offline environment populated 
by poster advertisements and graffiti they face an unquantifiable number of persuasive 
messages which they view and absorb. In this unregulated and uncontrollable communication 
environment facts are permeable, all truths are contestable, and so the citizen must resort to 
shortcuts and heuristics to determine the extent that one claim is truer than another. The 
logical conclusion is that when a citizen is presented with vastly contrasting arguments they 
are increasingly likely to attempt to make quick assessments based on gut feelings. 
 
Election campaigns are perhaps the epitome of a post-truth communication environment; a 
time of highly contrasting claims, the distorting of facts and gut feelings being relied upon to 
disaggregate information from disinformation. The same statistics can be quoted, or 
misquoted, by multiple parties or candidates to gain political capital; blame is apportioned for 
negative outcomes and subsequently countered; promises are made backed by evidence 
which is often questioned; much of the time elections to be more about competing sets of 
truths than competing visions. Political campaigners often work with the belief that if a claim 
is made often enough it will become recognised as a truth. It is suggested that beliefs, in 
claims of dubious veracity or in individuals of questionable credibility, indeed proved 
influential in a number of key election contests (Baron, 2018). But often such suggestions are 
from opponents of the side accused of peddling disinformation. So what evidence is there that 
voter decisions are made on the basis of ill-founded, non-evidenced beliefs and emotions, 
rather than facts? The article draws on a small qualitative study of UK voters to explore the 
way voters explain the reasoning that underpinned their voting decisions to leave the EU 
(what is referred to widely as Brexit) and to voted Labour during the 2017 general election in 
constituencies where the party were third place and their votes were unlikely to influence the 
election outcome.  
 
The data indicates that information processing behaviours among voters may lead to elections 
being determined by the extent that one side had the better story, the more engaging slogans 
and visuals as opposed to the best evidenced case. The claim is not that all Brexit and Labour 
voters did so for shallow, belief-driven, reasons; rather that these played a part and so their 
role, and the role of post-truth, in election campaigning may be significant. Prior to 
presenting the data on which we base those conclusions the article will set out the context, 
and explain how the contests are interesting for the study of post-truth politics and present the 
theoretical lens through which we understand how citizens might use shortcuts to navigate 
post-truth environments such as election contests. 
 
Voters and voting in the UK 2016-17: the context 
The Brexit referendum and subsequent general election are perfect post-truth environments. 
At both the divisions were between polarising images of British society. With Brexit the 
division was over whether Britain as a nation and people would be better off within or outside 
the European Union. The election just under a year later was ostensibly about Theresa May 
seeking her own mandate as prime minister and a larger majority in parliament in order to 
‘deliver Brexit’. An important sub-text was the question of who was best to manage the 
Brexit process and how the settlement should look. The Conservative hard-Brexit, free 
market, no compromise mantra opposed the Labour vision of a post-Brexit society built upon 
fairness and equality through state regulation and nationalisation. There was also a potent 
personality-driven message, incumbent prime minister and leader of the Conservatives 
Theresa May pitched herself as offering ‘strong and stable’ leadership through the uncertainty 
of Brexit. The branding was intended to contrast her with that of Labour leader Jeremy 
Corbyn, who had divided the parliamentary party over his politics and leadership style since 
being elected leader in September 2015, had faced an unsuccessful leadership challenge and 
was depicted in the media as being deficient in the qualities required to lead the country 
(Guardian, 2016). 
 
The media environment contributed further to the polarisation as well as the post-truth 
environment. The tabloid press were biased heavily in favour of Brexit during the referendum 
and levelled attacks against Corbyn throughout his tenure as leader and during the election 
campaign (Barnett, 2017). Social media was equally dominated by Brexit arguments, with 
claim and counter-claim circulating as well as incredulity at some of the claims made 
regarding the threat posed to Britain of voting leave. The coherence and reach of the leave 
supporting Facebook campaign sites showed greater levels of enthusiasm, activism and 
homogeneity, as well as creating large amounts of engaging and shareable images, all 
indicating the campaign would probably have higher reach among those less interested in 
politics (Lilleker & Bonacci, 2017). During the election meme wars raged, each amusing 
image seeking to impact the attitudes of undecided voters. The main contributors were a 
range of pro-Corbyn blogs, Twitter feeds and Facebook pages which were created to counter 
the anti-Corbyn media narrative. While Corbyn was pictured as a man of the people, May 
was characterised as robotic, out of touch and after not appearing during a leaders’ debate 
missing from the campaign. Thus photoshopped images and memes promoting Corbyn and 
attacking May were circulated widely across social media platforms (Dutceac & Bossetta, 
2017). As with the pro-Leave side during the referendum, pro-Corbyn activist sites offered 
engaging and shareable materials, and enjoyed much higher levels of activism, again 
potentially engaging voters with traditionally lower levels of interest. 
 
The role of social media may have been significant as both contests saw higher turnout 
among groups which usually do not vote. The lower-educated, white working class with low 
income turned out in much higher numbers and were most likely to vote Brexit (Menon & 
Salter, 2016; Hobolt, 2016). These groups tend often to be more frequent users of social 
media, particularly Facebook, and so were potentially more exposed to persuasive visuals 
shared campaign pages. Clearer data on the relationship between political knowledge, 
Internet use and voting behaviour is found from the 2017 British Election Survey data. 39% 
of respondents used the internet a great deal or a fair amount at the time of the 2017 UK 
general election and those respondents were significantly more likely to vote Labour. 61% of 
those who used the internet "a great deal" to gather news about the general election opted for 
Labour, compared with only 21% who voted Conservative. In contrast 56% who said they 
rarely or never used the internet voted Conservative, 30% voted Labour. Given that turnout 
among 18-29 year olds was up by an estimated 19% compared to 2015, a group that 
predominantly voted Labour, it seems the online campaign achieved two aims. Firstly it 
succeeded in mobilising people to turn out and vote; secondly it influenced their voter choice. 
The concern is that the latter may be most pronounced among the least politically 
sophisticated. Survey respondents who used the internet a great deal but scored low on the 
political knowledge test were most likely to vote Labour. Heavy internet users with high 
political knowledge tended to vote Conservative. The effects held across all age groups, 
except Conservative-voting pensioners. Therefore political knowledge was a strong predictor 
of voting behaviour even when controlling for social class, age, gender, income, left-right 
placement and how they voted in the 2016 referendum (Clarke et al, 2017). We should not 
assume from this data that heavy internet using Labour voters are inherently less intelligent or 
even politically sophisticated; the measures of political knowledge are simple but are not 
measures of understanding political choices per se. Political knowledge test questions ask 
respondents to agree or disagree with questions like "The minimum voting age for UK 
general elections is now 16 years of age," or "The chancellor of the Exchequer is responsible 
for setting interest rates in the UK". These questions measure levels of being informed about 
political processes. However, a lack of knowledge can suggest lower levels of interest and 
engagement. Citizens who have low interest but are mobilised to vote are likely, much like 
the student quoted at the start of the article, to seek shortcuts that aid them make their choice. 
The post-truth environment around each contest provided a range of simple heuristic 
communication that could create beliefs and reinforce biases regarding political actors and 
make their policy choices more appealing. Hence we hypothesise that those who voted, but 
had lower levels of political interest, would rely to some extent on cognitive shortcuts offered 
by more simple but persuasive forms of communication which characterise post-truth 
political environments. To explain this hypothesis we turn to communication psychology 
research. 
 
Dual processing, heuristics and bias: why post-truth undermines civic life 
Citizens with lower levels of interest or intellectual sophistication are argued to make 
cognitive shortcuts in order to solve problems; they lack the ability or interest to solve 
problems using more developed cognitive processes. In practice this involves making quick 
associations based on heuristic cues, for example well-designed and engaging images that stir 
an emotion. This contrasts with the ‘high-effort, systematic reasoning’ which it is claimed 
should underpin voter choice making (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). The cognitive modes of 
engagement were classically defined as using ‘System 1’ or ‘System 2’ styles of reasoning 
(Kahneman, 2011). System 1 reasoning involves visceral, emotionally-driven gut reactions to 
communication, normally leading to over-estimations of positive or negative implications. 
This manner of reasoning can lead a voter to judge a politician, depicted as being surrounded 
by ordinary-looking people, to be more ‘in-touch’. Also, they may over-estimate threats 
posed by terrorists or even immigrants when faced with sensationalised claims. In contrast, 
System 2 reasoning involves reflection and evidence based evaluation. This type of reasoning 
can involve questioning claims; a system 2 thinker may reflect on the number of deaths and 
injuries caused by terrorists, or investigate facts to evaluate the economic and social impact 
of immigration. In other words System 2 reasoning will lead to decisions that were not 
formed from exposure to simplistic images and slogans, whereas System 1 reasoning allows 
the formation of the beliefs that are of concern when we consider the post truth phenomenon.  
 
The dual processing model maps neatly to Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) elaboration 
likelihood model (ELM). The ELM suggests that individuals who lack either the interest or 
the ability, and particularly both, will only process information peripherally. Images and 
slogans are absorbed into the subconscious, or schema, and then recalled at the point when a 
choice needs to be made. The claim that System 1, peripheral processing, is lacks reasoning 
has been challenged (Mercier & Sperber, 2017). A body of work has emerged to counter the 
dichotomy between emotion and reason, suggesting the two cannot be disconnected under 
normal circumstances (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In fact cognitive science demonstrates 
that it is a lack of emotional intelligence which leads to psychopathic tendencies (Lorenz & 
Newman, 2002). Therefore we should think of System 1 and System 2, as with peripheral and 
central processing, as being on a scale where logic, reason and emotion interact to differing 
extents to determine behavioural choices (Lilleker, 2014, pp 80-99). Where there is low 
cognitive engagement, and a gut or emotional response is made, judgment errors are found. 
Judgement errors allow citizens to judge a politician with an authentic style as honest, they 
allow headlines which repeat claims to be used as evidence, they underpin beliefs that act as 
mental shortcuts but which are founded more on an emotional response to communication 
than reasoned evaluation of a range of salient facts (Kahan, 2013).  
 
Politics, and particularly elections, are competitions between contested and largely 
unverifiable viewpoints. The complexity demands serious evaluation of claims matched with 
value judgements regarding outcomes, to assess which party, leader or set of policy claims 
appear most likely to deliver the outcome that most closely matches the individual’s values. 
However, citizens do not begin to engage, whether centrally or peripherally, with an election 
as a tabula rasa. Rather citizens possess a complex range of values and preconceptions about 
how the world and the nation should be run, about the key organisations and individuals 
competing for election, as well as about the other sources of information that are available to 
them (Lilleker & Pekalski, 2019). A political position, a party’s competence or a new leader’s 
abilities may be determined by media frames. Basically how the media portrays any of these 
can develop widely held perceptions: one can think here of Ed Miliband’s lack of competence 
being exemplified by a picture of him looking stupid while eating a bacon sandwich (de Witt, 
2017). Media, the repeat-remind strategies of political campaigners and the churn of viral 
information online can also lead to what one study referred to as adherence to ‘sticky 
misinformation’ (Lewandowsky et al, 2015). Whether the ‘fact’ be that Iraq possessed 
weapons of mass destruction, Obama was a Muslim, or that vaccines lead to autism, 
independent of subsequently being debunked some continue to believe the veracity of a claim 
if repeated often enough. Over the course of an election campaign, arguably this phenomenon 
can have significant power. Framing and prolonged exposure can lead to the formation of 
attitudes towards positions, organisations and leaders and, among lower engaged citizens, 
lead them to seek confirmation bias (Nickerson, 1998).  
 
Once an attitude has formed, many do not want to experience dissonance by having that 
attitude challenged (Festinger, 1962). Hence they eschew competing views, or dismiss them 
as lacking objectivity, and assume to be true any information that confirms their preconceived 
beliefs and attitudes. If a belief is formed out of sensationalist headlines, memetic slogans or 
similar they may be flawed but they may still be protected from challenge and shape voting 
behaviour. Hence it is suggested that choices of media, whether the newspapers read or the 
Facebook groups joined, many seek affirmation rather than information and so can lock 
themselves into echo chambers within which one-sided and inaccurate claims abound 
(Mercier & Sperber, 2017). Carefully designed engaging images and slogans can support the 
formation of beliefs and attitudes and then the hardening of attitudes around value positions 
which aid citizens confirm their choice is correct.  
 
This provides in brief a psychological framework for understanding the cognitive 
mechanisms that undergird the post-truth environment. Put simply, at times of high 
contestation and competition over visions citizens seek simply answers to the question ‘which 
side would be best’. Their values and preconceptions take form as attitudes which cause them 
to lean one way rather than the other, especially when choices are polarised. New information 
is absorbed and filed in memory, creating perceptions of the world and its people; if post-
truth is a problem for democracy then those perceptions will be based on weak or non-
existent evidence. It is this latter question we seek insights into. 
 
Methodology 
The majority of studies which aim to understanding the motivations and reasoning that 
underpin political participation predominantly adopt a positivist approach and quantitative 
research methods (for example see van Biezen et al. 2012, Curtice 2005). These studies offer 
significant insights but struggle to explain the complex combinations of beliefs, opinions, 
feelings and emotions which interplay to determine voter choices, qualitative methods are 
deemed for appropriate for the examination of experiences and their impact (Denscombe 
2014). Qualitative methods enable researchers to gather data on voters’ own perspectives, 
using their language, and on their patterns of political engagement in their own terms (White 
et al. 2000). As participation in political activities is often the result of (interlinking) factors, 
in-depth interviews were most appropriate as they enable in-depth exploration of individual 
lived experiences and their bearing on voting decisions. To examine the data without a pre-
existing set of assumptions, we used principles of grounded theory (Flick 2014). We asked 
interviewees questions about the respective contests, their levels of interest and knowledge, 
their voter choices and how they were formed. Through the analysis we identified how they 
constructed their arguments, the evidence they drew on, when explaining how they arrived at 
their choice. The analytical process sought to identify how beliefs were formed, whether they 
were based on informed reasoning, or could we detect evidence that the shallow evidence 
synonymous with the post-truth phenomenon informed voter choices. Participants of both the 
study on Brexit and the 2017 general election were selected through purposive sampling as 
outlined below.  
 
2016 referendum 
The 2016 EU referendum saw Britain divided, and hence polarized suggesting high levels of 
complexity and contestation over voter choices. On average particular divisions were found 
by age, social class and education; older, less affluent and less educated Britons voted to 
Leave yet within each demographic there were fault lines. The most committed leave voters 
were over 60, a group who are most likely to vote and most likely to hold Conservative 
values. Many would have had the opportunity to vote in the 1975 referendum on the UK’s 
membership of the EEC, so these should be highly informed and experienced voters able to 
draw on years of news and experiences. Participants in the research on the 2016 EU 
referendum were selected based upon their age (all participants were over 60 years old), were 
British citizens (so had the right to vote) and voted to Leave the EU.  
 
2017 general election 
The 2017 UK general election provided similar levels of polarization around contested 
perspectives, and therefore a further opportunity to examine beliefs and disbeliefs and the 
influence on voting. Young people, 18-34, voted in greater numbers, the highest turnout 
among young people in 25 years (Burn-Murdoch 2017), and significantly influence the 
outcome of the election. Perceived traditions, such as the young being a “disaffected” 
generation in Britain (Fahmy 2006, p. 9) who are politically disengaged and so “ritual non-
voters” (Martin 2012, p. 21), were thus partially confounded in 2017. Not only did young 
people, at least across the 18-34 cohort, turned up in larger numbers, and they were also more 
likely to vote Labour (BBC 2017; Holder et al. 2017). Participants in the research on the 2017 
general election were the youngest voter group, aged between 20 to 24 years old, held UK 
citizenship (so eligible to vote in the 2017 general election); were all students or recent 
university graduates and lived in Bournemouth during the general election of 2017. The 
Bournemouth area represented safe Conservative seats, but turnout among young people was 
high and the Labour vote increased in the constituencies Bournemouth East, West and Poole 
respectively by 18.9%, 18.5% and 16.6% (retrieved from http://electionresults.parliament.uk 
on January 21st 2018). As young people have lower levels of electoral and political 
experience, this study offers a different comparison group to those interviewed regarding 
their participation at the EU referendum. 
 
The EU as a bundle of cues: decision making at the 2016 EU referendum  
Older voters were most likely to turn out at the referendum and to vote for the UK to leave 
the European Union. Polling data suggests the two major issues that drove the leave vote 
were immigration and sovereignty (Worcester et al, 2017), these were the central issues of the 
leave campaign and the most discussed issues by followers of the campaign on social media 
(Lilleker & Bonacci, 2017). However unpacking the perceptions older voters had 
demonstrates that the EU had become an entity which was blamed for wider social and 
political change that was not intrinsically tied to the UK’s membership. Interviewees’ 
explanations of their voting choices expressed powerful beliefs, yet ones that were largely 
erroneous. Interviewees referenced changes to the character of the British high streets, not 
only Polish delicatessens but also chain stores and coffee outlets claiming “you can’t buy 
local anymore” and asking “what happened to traditional English cafes”. Many older voters 
claimed they “feel like strangers in [their] country” yet struggled to reference the last time 
they met someone non-British. Similarly while referencing broad changes, mostly associated 
with globalization, when challenged they were unaware of whether change was due to EU 
membership or not. For example: 
 
“Look, in my lifetime I have seen Britain totally change. We see people from all over 
the world coming here, buying property, opening shops, even our footballers aren’t 
British. Whether it’s the EU or not doesn’t matter. I wanted to make things go back to 
as they were, to say we’ve had enough. I want my grandchildren to have a country 
like that I grew up in, safe and just a good place to live. I don’t think it is that 
anymore” 
 
The wide ranging critiques of 21st Century society thus appear to be bundled together and the 
referendum for these interviewees was not simply on EU membership but on the 50 or so 
years of social change they had experienced. Key to this is the notion of having lost control, 
hence the resonance of the sovereignty argument. 
 
Interviewees could not point to specific laws, but rather a feeling of having lost ‘control’, of 
borders, of the ability to act as a nation. Trivial media tropes such as diktats on the shape and 
size of fruit and vegetables that could be sold were referenced along with using the slogan 
‘taking our country back’ as a collective enterprise ‘we’ took. But largely the evidence drawn 
upon was a series of beliefs and feelings that invoke the notion of post-truth. Claims made to 
close down discussion such as “we’re Britain and no-one should dictate to us”; “once this 
country ruled the waves you know, now everyone tells us what to do” suggest strong feelings 
but low levels of engagement with factual information. While campaign themes regarding 
controlling laws and borders were reiterated, when challenged there were stark 
misunderstandings of how the EU worked as a law-making body. Challenges were met with 
strident claims or dismissals, retreating to confirmation of their biases: “well I’ve seen prime 
ministers going cap in hand to Brussels, don’t tell me that’s the British way”. A belief in what 
Britain should be, the nation that ‘built’ an empire, became a reference point demonstrating a 
desire to return to a golden age for the nation independent of the impossibility of achieving 
this that as was. Yet seldom was there an evidential link between loss of sovereignty and EU 
membership established. The power of the beliefs about what Britain should be, and the 
perceived opportunity to reverse history, ‘to take our country back to how it was’ is evidence 
that the contest had a powerful post-truth narrative running through it which captured the 
imaginations of many older voters who felt disconnected from 21st Century Britain. Onto the 
EU was projected all the negatives they felt characterized their experiences of modern Britain 
and thus leaving the EU was the change they believed would cure the ills of modern society. 
 
Image cues and decision making at the 2017 UK general election 
The younger voters in the 2017 UK general election referenced two motivating factors: their 
shock at the result of the referendum and their disappointment with the Conservative 
government and its continued commitment to austerity. Similar to the older Brexit voters, the 
election was seen as an opportunity to be heard. But in addition it was the perceived 
authenticity of Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, who they trusted to deliver a somewhat vague 
‘different sort of politics’, that cemented their engagement and was instrumental in 
motivating them to cast their ballots.  
 
The snap nature of the 2017 UK general election was an additional cause of disappointment 
among interviewees. Rather than a new prime minister seeking a personal mandate, these 
young people saw calling the 2017 election as a cynical move on the part of Theresa May to 
gain a larger parliamentary majority. This was a popular media trope, as was the fact that a 
larger majority would strengthen her position in the party and for Brexit negotiations 
(Asthana et al. 2017). But calling the election at a point when the Conservatives were leading 
in the polls,  "the worst moment it could be called at” was seen as a cynical move, and one 
that worried the majority of these voters who were united in their opposition to May’s 
approach to Brexit as well as domestic economic policy. The opposition to May seemed 
founded on informed engagement to some extent as interviewees argued “they say they’re 
going to help the working class, but they don’t”; “[She] says she wants to help black people, 
ethnic minorities or poor people then you don’t really believe that”. These statements suggest 
a few things. Firstly, interviewees identified themselves with the concerns of these minority 
groups, but more importantly they believed the May government claimed to share their 
concerns rhetorically only. Hence, and perhaps most significant in identifying evidence of 
post-truth beliefs, they defaulted to a position that politicians generally, and the 
Conservatives specifically, cannot be trusted to keep their promises. Despite the inability to 
give substantive examples of broken promises, they happily claimed promises would be 
broken. Yet Jeremy Corbyn was not seen as a politician that would break promises, he was 
believed to be trustworthy while May was not but there was no evidence presented to 
underpin the perceptions of the two leaders. 
  
Another reason for disappointment and frustration was the association with the hard-Brexit 
approach of May. All young participants in this study voted in favour of staying in the EU, a 
position that theoretically should have aligned them with the Liberal Democrats. Despite 
Corbyn’s long-term opposition to the EU and the fact he was frequently criticised for being 
disengaged from the remain campaign during the Brexit referendum (McSmith 2016) he was 
seen as the counter-balance to May’s approach. While some participants argued that the fate 
of the UK and the EU was decided with the referendum, and therefore Brexit positions were 
not key in voting decisions in the 2017 election, others suggested Corbyn would better 
represent their views. So despite interviewees demonstrating a higher propensity to engage in 
the 2017 election, they demonstrated confusion about the choices available and what they 
represented. Largely they viewed the contest as bipolar, May versus Corbyn, but could not 
evidence why one was more trustworthy than the other. Post-truth phenomena appear to have 
played a role in the choices made. 
 
Therefore while these younger voters did demonstrate a higher engagement with substantive 
policy issues and a degree of political sophistication, this does not fully resonate in their 
arguments for supporting Labour. While interviewees felt the Conservative party would not 
represent their interest, and they claimed they supported Labour based on the party’s policies 
and manifesto, when their support was explored in-depth they did not demonstrate high levels 
of knowledge about the platforms of either party. When asked to name concrete policies that 
they supported, they found it hard to be specific. Yet they could all mention reasons why they 
liked and backed Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn. This suggests two things. Firstly participants 
could be giving socially acceptable answers; they felt they should decide on policies but in 
reality this is not the main reason. Secondly, it is possible that participants relied on cues and 
simple associations when deciding who to vote for. Indications that point to the latter as a 
decisive factor suggests Corbyn’s personal appeal played a more significant role in the 2017 
election while also offering indications that emotion-driven beliefs became more important 
than evidence based reasoning.  
 
Voting based on the appeal of a leader is nothing new, Clarke et al. (2011) found that 
leadership evaluations are one of the main cues voters use to determine who to support in 
elections. Similar findings emerged during this study, and perceptions of the political leaders 
was a major topic ine every interview. Participants largely referred to PM May in negative 
terms, frequently mentioning that May as “not so strong and stable” or “weak and wobbly” 
(mocking the Conservatives’ slogan “strong and stable”). Corbyn, on the other hand, was 
seen as authentic, ordinary and interviewees believed he deserved their support as he had 
made the effort to reach out to the younger generation. His links to prominent figures on the 
youth music scene, such as JME, AJ Tracey and Stormzy rallied behind Corbyn (O’Connor 
2017), was referenced for example.  
 
"he actually interacted with them [young people], with rappers as well, who 
previously were completely disenfranchised… That was inspiring to see" 
 
The echo chamber they gravitated towards was populated with videos by rappers endorsing 
Corbyn, and this was used as a shortcut to indicate his interest in the issues that concerned 
them. Other videos and images were referenced as evidence of Corbyn being “really was 
among the people”, “down to earth” and a “normal bloke”. These images created a perception 
of his “authenticity” and so his trustworthiness. Interviewees suggested that in his 
performances he demonstrated his honesty, May on the other hand was viewed as dishonest, a 
further cue to his honesty was that he was not seen as a ‘politician’: "he has not really been an 
experienced front bench politician... He just comes across as a bloke" 
 
Across many of the interviews we found a combination of factors emerge. General feelings of 
aversion towards mainstream politicians, a mistrust of Conservatives and May particularly, 
and a positive view of Corbyn as a person. Being a politician was seen as a negative, with 
politics a dirty game (Bennett, 2008; Hay, 2007), Corbyn was seen as being an outsider. The 
support awarded him by other outsiders, rappers, close friends and those they follow on social 
media, were referenced as evidence of his ‘of the people’ status along with images of him 
‘among the people’. What was lacking was informed knowledge about his past or policies, 
apart from him being ‘anti-war’; some wanted to go for a beer with him ignorant to the fact 
he is virtually teetotal. The perception of him might be wholly accurate but it was founded on 
weak evidence, images and videos and the endorsements of certain types of celebrity or 
peers. Hence beliefs were formed about the character of Jeremy Corbyn and the power of 
these beliefs chime with the concerns raised about the rise of post-truth politics. Similar to the 
student quoted at the start of the article, the interviewees sought a politician they could 
believe in, Corbyn’s personality-centred campaign provided the cues they were seeking and 
they appear to then project on him the attributes they wished a politician to have (see Baron, 
2018, on projection) 
 
Discussion 
To what extent did post-truth, with beliefs being more important than facts, play a role in 
voter choice during Brexit and the 2017 general election? It is impossible to answer the 
question holistically, however we offer insights into the psyche of a small section of voters 
who, if in any way representative, appear to be driven far more by emotional attachments and 
bundles of beliefs than by reasoned evaluations of a range of facts. Older citizens who voted 
to leave the EU and young voters who voted Labour both expressed their motivations for 
doing so referencing simplistic arguments, with some misunderstandings, and offering little 
evidence to undergird the main arguments for their voting choices. In fact, at points there 
seemed a celebration that they lacked understanding and were able to rely on their beliefs. 
Some happily stated that they may not know about EU processes, or know much about 
Corbyn personally, but they knew what was wrong with society and could reference evidence 
that indicated their choice was correct. The problem is that evidence was nothing more than 
an image, a slogan or a headline. Trust in certain sources was also a theme, encapsulated in 
these two quotes: “That’s the Guardian’s line, but if you want to know what really happens 
you should read The Mail”; “the media lie all the time, you want to know the truth go on the 
Internet, that’s independent”.  Such arguments highlight the search for confirmation bias and 
the use of media for affirmation of a viewpoint, they also highlight the role media play in 
disseminating post-truth narratives. But the reasons for this are not necessarily related to the 
cognitive ability of citizens, but rather their feelings of disaffection and disconnection. 
Citizens in such states seek outlets that speak to their feelings, give their concerns voice and 
offer them a solution. The conflation of concerns about the globalization of the high street, 
multi-culturalism and immigration and stories about high levels of migration from the EU 
built a neat if flawed narrative that shaped voting behavior. The Leave campaign simply 
reinforced these views and provided a push towards the voting booth. Similarly distrust of 
politicians, opposition to austerity and feelings of disenfranchisement drew support to the 
outsider, the perceived man of the people. A tactic employed by many populists which is 
found to be successful. The problem is the weak evidence base for the connections made 
between the desired outcome and the voter choice. In probing our interviewees’ reasoning, 
we found greater evidence of what Kahneman (2011) described as system 1 reasoning; 
judgements based on gut-reactions and beliefs. 
 
The data is of course limited, it was a small sample of self-selecting volunteers who 
conformed to a broad categorization. One might expect such volunteers to have higher levels 
of engagement and sophistication firstly, as they were willing to take time to talk about their 
voting behaviour. Some did argue that they wanted to explain themselves, feeling some 
sections of the media were portraying them as stupid or gullible. However, despite the 
caveats, we found interesting evidence that pointed to the validity of many of the arguments 
surrounding post-truth. That voter decisions were based on inferences drawn from 
communicational cues as opposed to detailed analysis of a range of information. At key 
points during the interviews, there was a uniform inability to provide evidence of in-depth 
knowledge about the factors at stake during each very important contest. At points this lack 
of knowledge is evidenced by the repetition of soundbites: “taking our country back” or “not 
so strong and stable” for example. At another level it is their failure to offer detail or specifics 
when challenged on substantive issues and for older voters to be defensive if their reasoning 
was questioned. Both of these suggest these voters conform to the concerns raised by critics 
of post-truth politics. While it is impossible to get a clear sense of how perceptions were built 
up over time, especially for the older Brexit-supporting voters, as well as whether partisan 
biases led younger voters to distrust a Conservative leader more than the Labour alternative. 
However the sense is that simple memetic communication forms were used both for 
confirmation bias as well as to reinforce perceptions and that these were more prominent in 
their memories than more detailed evidence relating to the case presented by either side 
during the contests. The referencing of these peripheral cues suggests they were important 
and thus helped form beliefs about the outcomes of a contest if a vote was cast a particular 
way. Of course using this as a general criticism of these voters invokes an idealised version 
of a good citizen, one that is informed and rational but which may never have existed. 
However, if the drift is towards a reliance on intense emotional reactions incurred by the 
juxtaposition of simple images presenting the case for each side, then we are moving to a 
situation where election outcomes will be increasingly informed by simple and slick 
marketing, by the claim that appears believable, made by the person deemed most 
trustworthy, but without a clear evidence base for making those judgments.  
 
The evidence suggests these voters, and many similar to them, made cognitive connections 
between normative beliefs about British society, past and present, and peripheral cues 
circulating during the course of the campaigns. Put simply they drew inferences from the post 
truth political communication landscape in order to inform their choices. Reinforcement bias 
led them to select reject or simply ignore some arguments, while accepting others without 
serious evaluation, in the search for an outcome that offered hope. This highlights the issue at 
the heart of the post-truth phenomenon. The disconnection from political institutions and low 
trust in politicians can be exploited by individuals and organisations that present themselves 
as being more in-touch with the public mood, more authentically of the people and outsiders 
to the political system. Obama, Modi, Trump and Macron each used such devises to win their 
respective contests, so did many pro-Brexit campaigners. Corbyn came close and caused a 
political earthquake. Corbyn’s fans can retain their belief that the situation would be better 
had he won. What we see in what some call the post-truth era is slick marketing attempting to 
sell political ideas via myriad channels, often with the source disguised, to citizens when they 
not cognitively prepared to give an argument careful thought: here we might think about the 
political meme that appears on a Facebook feed being scrolled through during the daily 
commute.  In the modern age of electioneering, big data analysis and market testing can 
highlight what phrases and promises will resonate most and deliver votes. What has been 
bluntly referred to as a ‘do/say anything to win’ strategy concerns making claims, however 
false, in order to secure votes (ElSheikh, 2018). When messages can be microtargeted to 
voters via social media, under the radar of opponents, election observers or investigative 
journalists, it is unclear what it is that citizens see, believe and so are influenced by. But those 
candidates who exploit voter dreams and fears, build campaigns that rely on peripheral cues 
and reinforcement bias, risk damaging the core principles of democratic institutions. Citizens, 
like the student the article opened with, will search for the truth claim they feel most 
believable. If they later feel disappointed with the outcome they will become more sceptical. 
It is likely they will withdraw from engaging with politics, until the next believable claim 
reinvigorates their interest. But if interests are more likely to be piqued by memes, promoting 
distrust of the status quo and promoting a nebulous change, and that leads to a vote for an 
outcome that is undeliverable it is likely to increase scepticism. Citizens, media and political 
campaigners need to increase their vigilance, ensure their work promotes democratic values, 
if not political campaigns will be seen as the ultimate post-truth environment to which few 
pay attention.  
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